A central feature of collective decision-making in many social groups, such as political coalitions, international unions, or private clubs, is that the rules that govern regulations, procedures for future decision-making, and inclusion and exclusion of members are made by the current members and under the current regulations. This feature implies that dynamic collective decisions must recognize the implications of current decisions on future decisions. For example, current constitutional change must recognize how the new constitution will open the way for further changes in laws and regulations. We develop a general framework for the analysis of this class of problems. We provide both an axiomatic and a noncooperative characterization of dynamically stable states and show that, under relatively mild assumptions, these exist and are unique. We then apply our framework to a variety of problems in political economy, in coalition formation, and in the analysis of the dynamics of clubs. Major insights that emerges from this framework are: (1) a particular social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by su¢ ciently many members of the society; (2) e¢ ciency-enhancing changes are often resisted because of the further social changes that they will engender.
Introduction
Consider the problem of a society choosing its constitution, which will determine economic payo¤s and the procedures for future decision-making. The current rewards from adopting a speci…c constitution will naturally be important in this decision. But, as long as the members of the society are forward-looking and patient, the future implications of the constitution may be even more important. For example, a constitution that encourages economic activity and bene…ts the majority of the population may nonetheless create future instability or leave room for a minority to seize control over the decision-making process. If so, the society-or the majority of its members-may rationally shy away from adopting such a constitution.
Many problems in political economy, club theory, organizational economics, and industrial organization have a structure resembling this example of constitutional choice. Another simple example is the problem of a club choosing its membership, recognizing that new members will take part in the future expansion or contraction decisions. Another is the problem of dynamic coalition formation, where parties forming a coalition recognize that members of the coalition will have a say over policy choices and the survival prospects of the coalition. Similar considerations arise in the context of an organization deciding how to restructure itself and how much power to give to a CEO or to a board of directors. They also arise in the context of a cartel or supply-network deciding its membership.
In this paper, we develop a general framework for the analysis of dynamic group-decisionmaking over constitutions, coalitions, and clubs. Although our model is motivated by political economy applications, it is general enough to nest the examples mentioned above (and a range of related problems discussed in the literature; see below). Formally, we consider a society consisting of a …nite number of in…nitely-lived individuals. The society starts in a particular state, which can be thought of as the constitution of the society, regulating how economic decisions are made and thus determining stage payo¤s, and how the society can change its state (constitution), for example, which subsets of individuals can decide to reform the constitution and which other subsets can block such decisions, etc. This is a dynamic game of nontransferable utility (since the current constitution determines the current payo¤ for each member of the society). Our focus is on the equilibria of this dynamic game when individuals are su¢ ciently forward-looking (patient). In particular, we show the existence and characterize the structure of dynamically stable states, which are de…ned as states that arise and repeat themselves. This game is su¢ ciently general to encompass a wide variety of economic, political and social situations; dynamically stable states are of particular interest when they exist and when individuals are patient.
Our analysis has two parts. The …rst part focuses on an axiomatic characterization of dynamically stable states. This part is motivated by the observation that when individuals are su¢ ciently forward-looking, an individual will not wish to support change towards a state (constitution) that might ultimately lead to another, less preferred state. This notion can be captured by a simple stability axiom. Using this stability axiom, together with two other natural axioms and a set of minimal assumptions on the acyclicity of preferences, we characterize the full set of "outcome mappings". These mappings determine all dynamically stable states reachable from any intitial state for any society. Under an additional assumption (on pairwise comparability of alternative desirable states), we also show that this mapping determines a unique dynamically stable state. This axiomatic characterization is simple and captures the economic essence of the examples mentioned above and of those that will be discussed in greater detail below.
The second part of our analysis provides a natural extensive-form noncooperative game capturing the same economic forces as those emphasized in the axiomatic characterization. It then shows that, under the same assumptions as above and as the discount factor tends to 1, this dynamic game has an (essentially) unique pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium, in the sense that all equilibria lead to the same unique dynamically stable state as the axiomatic analysis. 1 We also provide a recursive characterization of the set of dynamically stable states. This characterization is not only simple (the set of dynamically stable states can be computed using induction), but it also emphasizes a fundamental insight: a particular state is dynamically stable only if there does not exist another state that is dynamically stable and is preferred by a set of players that form a winning coalition within the initial state.
Both the axiomatic and the noncooperative approaches emphasize the same economic forces, in particular, the natural lack of commitment that exists in dynamic decision-making-those that gain additional decision-making power as a result of reform (change in constitution or expansion in club size etc) cannot commit to refraining from certain further choices that would hurt the initial set of decision-makers. This lack of commitment also implies that the unique dynamically stable state is often ine¢ cient-in the sense that it may be Pareto dominated by the payo¤s in another state. The fact that both the noncooperative and the axiomatic analyses 1 An additional and technically important assumption in our noncooperative analysis is that there is a transaction cost incurred by all individuals every time there is a change in the state. This assumption is used to prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium and to rule out cycles without imposing stronger assumptions on preferences.
highlight the same set of economic forces and lead to the same dynamically stable states gives us con…dence that these forces are important in practice and the resulting dynamically stable states indeed correspond to the reasonable outcomes of the set of economic situations we are focusing on. We next provide a brief outline of some of the applications, together with a discussion of the relevant literature.
Example 1 (Ine¢ cient Inertia) As an introductory example, consider a society consisting of two individuals (or two social groups), E and M . E represents the elite and initially holds power, whereas M corresponds to the middle class. There are three states. The …rst is absolutist monarchy, a, in which E rules, with no checks and there are no political rights for M . The second is constitutional monarchy, c, in which E rules but with checks and balances, so that M has greater security and is willing to invest. The …nal state is democracy, d, where M becomes more in ‡uential and the privileges of E disappear. Re ‡ecting this situation, suppose that stage payo¤s satisfy w E (d) < w E (a) < w E (c) ;
In particular, w E (a) < w E (c) means that E has higher payo¤ under constitutional monarchy than under absolutist monarchy, because greater investments by M increase tax revenues.
M clearly prefers democracy to constitutional monarchy and is least well-o¤ under absolutist monarchy. Both parties discount the stage payo¤s with discount factor 2 (0; 1). As described above, states also specify decision rules. In absolutist monarchy, E decides which regime will prevail tomorrow. In constitutional monarchy, however, M accumulates enough wealth to contest E's political power. To simplify matters, suppose that starting in regime c, M decides next period's regime. In democracy, also, M decides. Now, starting in regime a, E must choose whether to stay in a or undertake a reform towards c (clearly a move to d is not desirable).
However, E forecasts that once the state becomes c, M will become su¢ ciently powerful and implement another reform towards d. Therefore, the choices facing E are between staying in a forever and undertaking a reform to c, which will then lead to d, giving E continuation utility
It is straightforward to see that with su¢ ciently large, the unique dynamically stable state starting with a is a. Moreover, this example also illustrates the potential ine¢ ciency of dynamically stable states. Both E and M would be strictly better o¤ in state c rather than in the dynamically stable state a.
The same reasoning would apply if there were more states in-between. For example, the …rst reform to c could lead to c 0 , then to c 00 , then to c 000 , so on, until the chain ends up at d. The states in-between need not be di¤erent political regimes. They could correspond to di¤erent laws or regulations within the same political regime (and they may also all provide greater utility to E than state a). Nevertheless, the same reasoning implies that as long as is su¢ ciently close to 1
and w E (d) < w E (a), E would not initiate the reform, even if the entire process of transitioning to d takes a large (but …nite) number of periods.
A similar game can also be used to represent the implications of concessions in wars. For example, a concession that will increase the payo¤s to both warring parties may not take place because it will change the future balance of power. Relatedly, a country may prefer to declare war that is costly to both to itself and to its opponent rather than allow its opponents to become stronger over time and demand concessions in the future.
Finally, this example could also be used to illustrate how organizations could be "conservative" and resist e¢ ciency-enhancing restructuring. For instance, the appointment of a CEO who would increase the value of the …rm may not be favored by the board of directors if they forecast that, down the line, the CEO would become powerful and reduce their privileges. 2
Example 2 (Voting in Clubs) A richer environment that is also naturally covered by our game is the problem of voting in clubs considered …rst in the seminal-unpublished paper by Roberts (1999) . Consider a society consisting of N individuals. Any subset of these individuals can become a club. If the current club is X t , then each individual receives a stage payo¤ w i (X t ), and current club members decide (with weighted or unweighted, majority or supermajority voting) whether the club should contract or expand, that is, they decide what tomorrow's club, X t+1 , should be. Roberts solves a special case of this environment. In particular, he assumes that individuals are ordered, j = 1; 2; :::; N , and X t must be an ordered subset of the form f1; :::; Jg for some J = 1; 2; ::; N . Finally, Roberts assumes that individual preferences satisfy the following "single-crossing" property: if individual j (weakly) prefers f1; :::; Jg to f1; :::; J 1g, then all j 0 > j have the same (strict) preference. Under these assumptions, Roberts establishes the existence of a mixed strategy Markov Voting Equilibrium (where a transition happens unless it is blocked by at least half of club members, see subsection 6.3) and of a Median Voter Equilibrium 2 Ideas related to this example have been discussed in a number of di¤erent (but connected) contexts. Robinson (1997) and Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) discuss how a dictator or an oligarchy may refrain from productive public goods or educational investments because they may be afraid of losing power. Rajan and Zingales (2000) also emphasize similar ideas and apply them in the context of organizations. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a) construct a dynamic model in which the elite may block technological improvements or institutional reforms, because it will destabilize the existing regime. Fearon (1996 Fearon ( , 2004 and Powell (1998) discuss similar ideas in the context of civil wars and international wars, respectively.
(where the most preferred choice of the median voter is implemented), and characterizes some of its properties. Our model nests a considerably more general version of this environment and enables us to establish the existence of a unique dynamically stable club (and a pure strategy equilibrium). In addition, it provides a more complete characterization of these dynamically stable states under weaker assumptions. Our analysis further reveals (perhaps more clearly) why majorities will not necessarily opt to move towards club sizes that will increase their stage payo¤s and why the resulting dynamically stable state (club) may be ine¢ cient-both of these are related to the natural commitment problems inherent in dynamic collective decision-making. Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) is another important paper with similar insights.
They also recognize that decisions on club size should take into account changes in the identity of pivotal agents. They consider a game in which any member of the club might unilaterally admit a new agent and characterize the equilibria of this dynamic game. Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2005) apply a simpli…ed version of Roberts's model to study the question of how current members should approach problems related to the expansion of the European Union. Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro's model is also special case of our general setup.
Finally, a modi…ed version of this game can also be used to analyzed franchise extension, as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006a) , Lizzeri and Persico (2004) , or Jack and Laguno¤ (2006) .
Example 3 (Self-Stable Constitutions) Another interesting and important political economy question related to the ideas discussed here is considered in Barbera and Jackson (2004) . In the …rst period of the game, all individuals are identical and choose a constitution. In the second and …nal period, individuals receive information about their ultimate preferences regarding the comparison of a status quo and an alternative. Barbera and Jackson characterize"self-stable" constitutions (which may have a di¤erent supermajority rule for reforming the constitution itself) that will remain in place after additional information arrives. Messner and Polborn (2004) and Aidt and Giovanni (2004) also consider related problems, where constitutions impose di¤er-ent supermajority requirements for decisions on di¤erent issues. As we will discuss in Section 6 an in…nite-horizon version of this class of games is also a special case of our general environment.
Example 4 (Dynamic Coalition Formation in Nondemocracies) In Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) , we considered the problem of dynamic coalition formation in nondemocratic societies, where subsets of a ruling coalition cannot commit to not sidelining the remaining members. Payo¤s are realized only after the game ends. A more general version of this environment, where coalition members receive stage payo¤s at each date and new members can be brought in to be part of the ruling coalition, will also be shown to be a special case of the environment studied here.
Examples 1-4 illustrate a subset of economic and political problems that can be analyzed as special cases of our model. We view the rich set of environments that are covered by our model and the relative simplicity of the resulting dynamic stable states as the main advantages of our approach. As such, in addition to those that have already been mentioned, we believe that both the speci…c results derived here and the general ideas can be applied to a range of problems in political economy, organizational economics, club theory and other areas. Some of these additional examples are discussed in Section 6.
On the theoretical side, Roberts (1999) and Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) can be viewed as the most important precursors to our paper. An interesting and ambitious recent paper by Laguno¤ (2006) constructs a general model of political reform motivated in part by Roberts (1999) and Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) as well as Acemoglu and Robinson's (2000, 2006a) and Lizzeri and Persico's (2004) analyses of franchise extension. Laguno¤'s (2006) approach is di¤erent from ours, however, since he focuses on "social choice rules"that represent di¤erent institutional environments and investigates whether a social choice rule will select itself.
Laguno¤'s analysis provides an insightful condition in terms of "time inconsistency" of a social rule that determines whether a particular set of institutions will persist, though he provides neither a uniqueness result nor a characterization of the set of equilibria (or the equivalent of our dynamically stable states).
The two papers most closely related to our work are Chwe (1994) and Gomes and Jehiel (2005) . Chwe studies a model where payo¤s are determined by coalitions and there are exogenous rules governing transitions from one coalition to another. Chwe considers concepts of consistent sets and stable sets and answers some interesting questions concerning their existence and the relationship between the two concepts. He does not present either an axiomatic, or noncooperative game-theoretic analysis. In particular, he provides no general uniqueness or characterization result on which outcomes will arise as stable states, while such results are at the heart of our paper. Gomes and Jehiel consider a …nite-state economy, where states determine payo¤s and potential transitions. Gomes and Jehiel allow for side payments among the players and establish existence of the equilibria under a set of assumptions and investigate whether ine¢ ciencies can arise. Once again, the general uniqueness and characterization results presented here are not contained in Gomes and Jehiel (and in fact, with side payments, we suspect that such results are not possible). Our analysis also shows how "ine¢ ciencies" (e.g., Pareto dominated outcomes) are possible as unique equilibria even when discount factors are arbitrarily high. Last but not least, in our paper a dynamically stable state depends on the initial state (this property holds even if all transitions are allowed). In the models studied by Gomes and Jehiel, in contrast, as the discount factor tends to 1, there is "ergodicity," in that the ultimate distribution of states does not depend on the initial state.
Finally, our work is also related to the rich area of club theory (see, for example, Buchanan, 1956 , Ellickson et al., 1999 , Scotchmer, 2001 . While the early work in this area was static, a number of recent papers have investigated the dynamics of club formation. In addition to Roberts (1999) and Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) , which were discussed above, some of the important papers in this area include Burkart and Wallner (2000) , who develop an incomplete contracts theory of club enlargement, Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001) who show that the requirement of a majority consent for admission to a jurisdiction may not be more restrictive than an unrestricted right to migrate, and Bordignon and Brusco (2003) . This last paper studies club enlargement in a dynamic environment and derives insights about the "enhanced cooperation agreements," which allow for sub-union formation inside the EU. Bordignon and Brusco show that, if the incumbent members can commit to a coordinated policy towards new members, the sub-union formation process can be e¢ cient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the general environment. Section 3 motivates and presents our axiomatic analysis. Section 4 introduces the dynamic noncooperative game and shows the equivalence between the Markov Perfect Equilibria of this game and the axiomatic solution of Section 3. Section 5 generalizes the baseline environment by allowing state-speci…c restrictions on transitions (i.e., not all reforms are possible starting in all states). Section 6 returns to the applications discussed above and provides a more detailed analysis of these applications, demonstrating how they can be treated as special cases of our model. Section 7 concludes, while the Appendix contains the proofs omitted from the text.
Environment
In this section, we introduce the general environment.
There is a …nite set of players I. Time is discrete and in…nite, indexed by t (t 1). There is a …nite set of states which we denote by S. We denote the number of elements of the sets I and S by jIj and jSj, respectively. Recall that these states may represent di¤erent institutions simply a¤ecting payo¤s, or constitutions that may a¤ect both payo¤s and the procedures for decision-making (e.g., the ruling coalition in power, the degree of supermajority, the weights or powers of di¤erent agents). Although our game is one of non-transferable utility, a limited amount of transfers can also be incorporated, by allowing multiple (but a …nite set of) states with the same procedure for decision-making but with a reallocation of payo¤s across players.
The initial state of the world is denoted by s 0 2 S and is taken as given. For any t 1, the state s t 2 S is endogenously determined. A non-empty set X I is called coalition, and
we denote the set of coalitions by C (that is, C is the set of nonempty subsets of I). Each state s 2 S is characterized by a pair (w s ( ) ; W s ). Here, for each …xed state s 2 S,
is a mapping assigning a positive stage payo¤ w s (i) to each individual i 2 I (w s (i) > 0 is useful as a normalization that makes zero payo¤ the worst outcome); W s is a (possibly empty) subset of C representing the set of winning coalitions for state s. Throughout the paper, we maintain the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Winning Coalitions) For any state s 2 S, W s C satis…es two properties:
Part (a) simply states that if some coalition X is winning for state s, then increasing the size of the coalition would not reverse this. This is a natural assumption for almost any decision rule. Part (b) rules out the possibility that two disjoint coalitions could be winning for the same state, thus imposing a form of (possibly weighted) majority or supermajority rule. Notice that W s = ? is not ruled out by this assumption. If W s = ?, then state s is exogenously stable. For each state s 2 S we de…ne the set of blocking coalitions by B s = fX 2 C j I n X = 2 W s g. Clearly, B s W s , meaning that winning coalitions are also blocking (but not necessarily vice versa).
We de…ne the following binary relations on the set of states S. For x; y 2 S, we write
In this case we call states x and y payo¤ -equivalent, or simply, equivalent. For any z 2 S, the binary relation z is de…ned by
If (2) holds, we say that y is weakly preferred to x in z. Relation z is de…ned by
If (3) holds, we say that y is strictly preferred to x in z. Relation clearly de…nes an equivalence class, in that if x y and y z, then x z. In contrast, the binary relations z and z may not even be transitive. Nevertheless, for any x; z 2 S we have x z x, and whenever W z is not empty (i.e., z is not exogenously stable), x z x. Also, for any x; y; z 2 S, y z x implies x z y, and similarly y z x implies x z y; these implications follow from Assumption 1.
The following assumption introduces some basic properties of payo¤ functions.
Assumption 2 (Payo¤ s) Payo¤ functions fw i ( )g i2I satisfy the following properties:
(a) For any nonempty collection of states Q S, there exists state z 2 Q such that for any
(b) For any nonempty collection of states Q S and for any s 2 S, there exists z 2 Q such that for any x 2 Q, x s z.
Part (a) of Assumption 2 requires that within any collection of states there exists a state z such that the set of players that prefer another state is not su¢ ciently large (not winning in z). Part (b) of Assumption 2, on the other hand, requires the same for winning coalitions within a given state s (naturally this part of the assumption is trivially satis…ed if Q only has two elements). Assumption 2 will play a major role in our analysis and ensures "acyclicity". In particular, note that part (a) rules out cycles of the form y z z, x y y, z x x, while part (b) rules out cycles of the form y s z, x s y, z s x. It is easy to construct examples to show that neither of the two parts of Assumption 2 follows from the other.
In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, which are natural in this context and are assumed to hold throughout the paper, we will also sometimes impose:
Assumption 3 (Comparability) For x; y; z 2 S such that x z z, y z z, and x y, either
This assumption states that if two states y and z are weakly preferred to x (in x), then y and z are x -comparable. It turns out that this condition is precisely the one necessary to guarantee uniqueness of equilibria of dynamically stable states. This assumption is not necessary for a range of our results, and for this reason, some of our main results are stated without imposing it.
At each date, each individual maximizes her discounted expected utility:
where 2 (0; 1) is a common discount factor and for now we can think of u t (i) as given by the payo¤ function w i ( ) introduced in Assumption 2. Throughout, we will consider situations in which is large.
We de…ne s 1 2 S as a dynamically stable state if in any equilibrium (by which we mean Markov perfect equilibria in pure strategies) of the game with s 0 = s 1 as the initial state, after some time T < 1 the state is s 1 (i.e., s t = s 1 for all t T ). In particular, our objective is to determine when such dynamically stable states exist and to characterize whether and which (dynamically stable) state will be reached starting from an (arbitrary) initial state s 0 2 S.
Axiomatic Characterization
The previous section described an economic and political environment; individuals derive utility from a state characterized by a particular set of rules, regulations, and ruling coalitions, and each state also speci…es the distribution of political power and the political rules for determining future states (i.e., whether the society will remain in the same state or will undergo reform and transition to another state). The extensive-form game, specifying how voting decisions and transitions take place, will be presented in the next section. Before presenting this extensiveform game and its analysis, the essential economic forces can be succinctly captured by an axiomatic characterization of the dynamically stable states. The key economic insight enabling this axiomatic characterization is the following: when individuals are patient, an individual
should not wish to transition to a state that will ultimately lead to another state giving her lower utility. This basic insight enables a tight characterization of axiomatically stable states (or simply stable states). The rationale for choosing this term is both because these states will be the stable points of a certain mapping , de…ned below, and in that later (Theorem 2) we will establish the equivalence between the notions of axiomatically and dynamically stable states in this game).
Our axiomatic characterization will determine a mapping : S ! S that will assign to each initial state s 0 2 S a dynamically stable state s 1 2 S. This axiomatic characterization will therefore bypass the analysis of the dynamics leading to this stable state, but simply determine the dynamically stable states given the initial state s 0 2 S.
In the spirit of the discussion in the previous two paragraphs, we impose the following three axioms on this mapping.
Axiom 1 (Desirability) If x; y 2 S are such that y = (x), then either y = x or y x x.
Axiom 2 (Rationality) If x; y; z 2 S are such that z x x, z = (z), and z x y, then
Axiom 3 (Stability) If x; y 2 S are such that y = (x), then y = (y).
All three axioms are natural in light of what we have discussed above. Axiom 1 essentially says that the population will not move to another state unless there is a winning coalition that supports this transition (for example, depending on the speci…cation, y x x might mean that starting with state x and majority rule, the majority of the population will vote for a reform towards y). Axiom 2 imposes the idea that if there exists some state z preferred to y by the group of decisive individuals starting in state x, then should not pick y ahead of z starting in
x. Finally and most importantly, Axiom 3 encapsulates the stability notion discussed abovethat an individual should not prefer a state that will ultimately lead to another, less preferred state. This notion is economically captured by the statement that if mapping will pick state y starting from state y, then it should also pick y starting from y (otherwise, y would lead to another state z, and as stated by Axiom 2, if this state z were indeed preferred to y, then would have picked z in the …rst instance).
Notice also that all of these notions apply to individual preferences. Since collective decisionmaking aggregates individual preferences, these axioms then indirectly apply to the mapping (e.g., might aggregate individual preferences according to majority rule or weighted supermajority rule, etc.).
The next de…nition reiterates the meaning of dynamically stable states and its relationship to mapping .
De…nition 1 (Dynamically Stable States) For any : S ! S that satis…es Axioms 1-3, a state s 2 S is axiomatically stable if (s) = s. The set of dynamically stable states is
The next theorem is one of our main results. It establishes the existence of axiomatically stable states and provides a recursive characterization of such states.
Theorem 1 (Axiomatic Characterization of Dynamically Stable States) Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then:
1. There exists mapping satisfying Axioms 1-3.
2. Any that satis…es Axioms 1-3 can be recursively computed as follows. Let 1 2 S be such that ( 1 ) = 1 . Then, construct the sequence of states n Then, for each k = 2; :::; jSj,
.
(If there exist more than one s 2 M k : @z 2 M k with z k s, we pick any of these; this corresponds to multiple functions).
3. For any two mappings 1 and 2 that satisfy Axioms 1-3 the stable states of these mappings coincide.
4. If, in addition, Assumption 3 holds, then the mapping that satis…es Axioms 1-3 is "payo¤ -unique" in the sense that for any two mappings 1 and 2 that satisfy Axioms 1-3 and for
Proof. (Part 1) To prove existence, we …rst construct the sequence of states
The construction is by induction. Suppose we have de…ned j for all j k 1, where k jSj.
Then applying Assumption 2(a) to the collection of states S n 1 ; : : : ; k 1 , we conclude that there exists k satisfying (5). By construction, is a bijection that satis…es (5).
The second step is to construct a candidate mapping : S ! S. This is again by induction.
For k = 1, let ( k ) = k . Suppose we have de…ned j for all j k 1 where k jSj. De…ne the collection of states implies that z 2 1 ; : : : ; k 1 . But the last condition, z k ( k ), now contradicts (7). This means that such z does not exist, and therefore Axiom 2 is satis…ed.
(Part 2) Suppose that 1 and 2 are two mappings satisfying Axioms 1-3. Consider the
If the sets of stable states of 1 and 2 do not coincide, there exists some k such that 1 j = j () 2 j = j for j < k, but either 1 ( k ) = k and 2 ( k ) 6 = k or 1 ( k ) 6 = k and 2 ( k ) = k . Without loss of generality assume the former is the case (the argument for the latter case is identical). By Axiom 1,
contradiction to the hypothesis that 1 ( k ) = k and 2 ( k ) 6 = k . Consequently, 1 (s) = s if and only if 2 (s) = s.
(Part 3) Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that 1 and mapping 2 and derive the conclusion that 2 (s) cannot equal y. This contradiction completes the proof.
Theorem 1 shows that a mapping that satis…es Axioms 1-3 necessarily exists and provides a su¢ cient condition for uniqueness. Even when the uniqueness condition, Assumption 3, does not hold, we know that axiomatically stable states coincide for any two mappings 1 and 2 that satisfy Axioms 1-3.
Theorem 1 also provides a simple recursive characterization of the mapping . Intuitively, Assumption 2(a) ensures that there exists some state 1 2 S, such that there does not exist another state s 2 S with s 1 1 . Taking 1 as base, we recursively construct the set of states M k C, k = 1; :::; jSj, that includes axiomatically stable states that are preferred to state k (that is, (s) = s and s k k ). When the set M k is empty, then no axiomatically stable state is part of a winning coalition starting in state k , and therefore we must have ( k ) = k . When this set is nonempty, then we can pick an axiomatically stable state that will arise starting from state k . In addition to its recursive (and thus easy-to-construct) nature, this characterization is useful because it highlights a fundamental property of axiomatically stable states: a state k is made stable precisely by the absence winning coalitions in k favoring a transition to another stable state. We will see that this insight plays an important role in the applications in Section 6.
We have motivated the analysis leading up to Theorem 1 with the argument that, when agents are su¢ ciently forward-looking, only axiomatically stable states should be observed (at least in the "long run"). The analysis of the extensive-form game in the next section will substantiate this interpretation further.
Noncooperative Foundations of Dynamically Stable States
We now describe an extensive-form game meant to capture the basic economic interactions emphasized so far in the simplest possible way. The main result of this section will establish the equivalence between the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of this extensive-form game and the axiomatic characterization of Theorem 1.
The essential features of the extensive-form game are a protocol for a sequence of agendasetters and proposals at each date, and a protocol for voting over proposals. We do this by introducing a natural number K s and a mapping s : f1; : : : ; K s g ! I [ S for each state s 2 S. This mapping speci…es a …nite sequence of elements from I [ S, where K s ( jIj + jSj) is the length of sequence for state s and determines the sequence of agenda-setters and proposals. In particular, if s ( ) 2 I, then it denotes an agenda-setter who will make a proposal from the set of states S. Alternatively, if s ( ) 2 S, then it directly corresponds to an exogenously-speci…ed proposal over which individuals vote. Therefore, the extensive-form game is general enough to include both proposals for a change to a new state initiated by agendasetters (a subset of the players that may depend on the state) or those that are exogenously placed on the table (as is the case in standard voting models where alternatives are voted over in pairwise contests). We impose the following mild requirements on s ( ):
Assumption 4 (Agenda-Setting and Proposals) For every state s 2 S, one (or both) of the following two conditions is satis…ed:
(a) For any state q 2 S, there is an element k : 1 k K s of sequence s such that
This assumption implies that either sequence s contains all possible states or it allows all possible agenda-setters to eventually make a proposal.
The game starts at time t = 1 with agenda-setting period and with state s 0 exogenously given. Each period begins with state s = s t 1 . After that, for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K s g, the following procedure takes place. First, proposal P k;t 2 S is determined: if s (k) 2 S, then P k;t = s (k) automatically; if s (k) 2 I, then P k;t is proposed by agenda-setter s (k). After this stage, proposal P k;t is voted against the status quo s; voting is sequential according to some predetermined sequence (we will show that this sequence does not matter for our results) and each player can say either yes or no. Let Y k;t be the set of those who vote yes for proposal P k;t (at time t and stage t). The proposal is accepted if Y k;t 2 W s and rejected otherwise; intuitively, it takes a winning coalition to move to a new proposal. If the proposal is accepted, then transition to state s t = P k;t takes place and the voting ends, otherwise, the voting process moves one step ahead to next k. If all proposals are rejected, then the status quo remains until the next period, so s t = s t 1 . This simple game form, together with the assumption on "transaction costs" that players incur when s t 6 = s t 1 (see below), it enables us to prove the existence of a pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Although the existence of pure strategy equilibria can be guaranteed using other assumptions on the extensive-form game, none of these are as simple, or as natural, as the one we are using here. 3
Payo¤s in this dynamic game are given by (4), with
for each i 2 I. In other words, in the period in which a transition occurred (that is, if the current state is not the same as the state in the previous period), each individual receives zero payo¤.
In all other periods, each individual receives the payo¤ as speci…ed in Assumption 2. The period of zero payo¤ can be interpreted as representing a "transaction cost"associated with the change in the state. Since the game is in…nitely-repeated and is high, this one period of zero payo¤ should not be of major consequence. In particular, once (and if) a dynamically stable state is reached), individuals will receive w s (i) at each date thereafter.
We next de…ne a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). For this purpose, consider a general n-person in…nite-stage game, where each individual can take an action at every stage. Let the 3 In future versions we may switch to one of these alternative excessive-forms. One possibility is to assume that voting continues at each date (so that st = st 1 does not cause the game to end), but allow individuals to abstain in voting (and also assume simultaneous voting). In this case, we can have that for a proposal P k;t = st starting with state st 1 at time t, Y k;t = 2 Ws t 1 and N k;t = 2 Bs t 1 . If this is the case, all players receive payo¤ wi (st 1), and next period Pt+1 = st again (i.e., the incomplete voting from the previous round continues) and only those who have not cast their votes already vote at this point. Using this alternative game, we can establish the equivalents of Theorems 2 and 4 below. with a i t 2 A i t and a i 2 A i = Q 1 t=1 A i t . Let h t = (a 1 ; : : : ; a t ) be the history of play up to stage t (not including stage t), where a s = a 1 s ; : : : ; a n s , so h 0 is the history at the beginning of the game, and let H t be the set of histories h t for t : 0 t T 1. We denote the set of all potential histories up to date t by H t = S t s=0 H s . Let t-continuation action pro…les be with the set of t-truncated action pro…les for player i denoted by A i; t . We also use the standard notation a i and a i to denote the action pro…les for player i and the action pro…les of all other players (similarly, A i and A i ). The payo¤ functions for the players depend only on actions,
i.e., player i's payo¤ is given by u i a 1 ; : : : ; a n .
A (possibly mixed) strategy for player i is
where (X) denotes the set of probability distributions de…ned over the set X, and for any h 2 H 1 actions in the support of i (h) are feasible. A t-continuation strategy for player i (corresponding to strategy i ) speci…es plays only after time t (including time t), i.e.,
where H 1 n H t 2 is the set of histories starting at time t.
A continuation strategy i;t is Markovian if A pure strategy MPE is de…ned as a MPE in which only pure strategies are used.
Our main result is given in the following theorem and establishes a close correspondence between the MPEs of the game described here and the outcomes picked by mapping described in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Noncooperative Foundations of Dynamically Stable States) Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, is su¢ ciently close to 1, and the initial state is s 0 2 S. Then:
1. For any mapping satisfying Axioms 1-3 there is a set of sequences f s ( )g s2S and a
MPE of the game such that s t = (s 0 ) for any t 1. In other words, the game reaches (s 0 ) in a …nite number of steps (after one period) and stays in this state thereafter.
2. Conversely, for any set of sequences f s ( )g s2S , any MPE in pure strategies has the property that it reaches a certain state, s 1 , in a …nite number of periods (with one transition): for t 1, s t = s 1 . Moreover, there exists mapping : S ! S that satis…es Axioms 1-3 such that s 1 = (s 0 ).
3. If, in addition, Assumption 3 holds, then the MPE is essentially unique in the sense that for any set of sequences f s ( )g s2S , any MPE strategy pro…le induces s t (s 0 ) for all t 1, where satis…es Axioms 1-3.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Limited State Transitions
We have so far assumed that any transition (from any state into any other state) is possible.
In many interesting applications, there will be certain transitions that are not possible. For example, in Example 1 discussed in the Introduction, it may be that a transition to democracy is only possible from constitutional monarchy (and not directly from absolutist monarchy).
Another more substantial example highlighting the importance of limited transitions is the model in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) The key to the analysis in this section is the binary relation on the set of states S. For any x; y 2 S, we write x y to denote that a transition from x to y is possible and x Q for some Q S to denote that the transition to any state z in Q is possible (provided that these positions are supported by a winning coalition in x). Our analysis so far thus corresponds to the special case where x S for any x 2 S. We adopt the following natural assumption on the transition relation.
Assumption 5 (Feasible Transitions) Relation satis…es the following properties:
(a) (re ‡exivity) 8x 2 S : x x;
(a) (transitivity) 8x; y; z 2 S : x y and y z imply x z.
Part (b) Assumption 5 requires that if some indirect transition from x to z is feasible, so is a direct transition between the states. Without requiring transitivity, there would be additional technical details to take care of, because, for instance, if transition from x to z is possible through y only, then it is only possible if both a winning coalition in x prefers z to x and a winning coalition in y prefers z to y. 4 Nevertheless, this assumption can be dispensed with, and we could assume instead that whenever x y and y z but x 6 z, then W x = W y (or a weaker version of this assumption).
We next consider slightly weaker versions of Assumption 2 and Assumption 3, incorporating the fact that only certain transitions are feasible (since when some transitions are not feasible, it becomes easier to rule out cycles).
Assumption 2 0 (Payo¤ s with Limited Transitions) Payo¤ functions fw i ( )g i2I satisfy the following properties:
(a) For any nonempty Q S such that x y for any x; y 2 S, there exists state z 2 S such that for any x 2 S, we have x z z;
(b) For any s 2 S, let Q be some nonempty subset of set fy 2 S : s yg. If Q is nonempty, then there exists z 2 Q such that for any x 2 Q we have x s z.
Assumption 3 0 (Comparability with Limited Transitions) For x; y; z 2 S such that z x, z y, x z z, y z z, and x y, either y z x or x z y.
Finally, let us reformulate Axioms 1-3 for this slightly modi…ed set up (note that Axiom 3 is unchanged, though we state it again for completeness).
Axiom 1 0 (Desirability) If x; y 2 S are such that y = (x), then either y = x or x y and
Axiom 2 0 (Rationality) If x; y; z 2 S are such that x z, z x x, z = (z), and z x y, then y 6 = (x).
Axiom 3 0 (Stability) If x; y 2 S are such that y = (x), then y = (y).
With this new set of Axioms, a slightly modi…ed version of Theorem 1 holds:
Theorem 3 (Dynamically Stable States with Limited Transitions) Suppose that binary relation satis…es Assumption 5, and that Assumptions 1 and 2 0 hold. Then:
1. There exists mapping satisfying Axioms 1 0 -3 0 . 
Any mapping that satis…es Axioms
3. For any two mappings 1 and 2 that satisfy Axioms 1 0 -3 0 the stable states of these mappings coincide.
4. If, in addition, Assumption 3 0 holds, then the mapping that satis…es Axioms 1 0 -3 0 is "payo¤ -unique" in the sense that for any two mappings 1 and 2 that satisfy Axioms 1 0 -3 0 and for any s 2 S, 1 (s) 2 (s).
Proof. The proof is an extension of that of Theorem 1. The idea of the proof is to construct a mapping (sequence) : f1; : : : ; jSjg $ S such that for any 1 k < jSj we have that
To construct mapping , for each x 2 S we consider its equivalence class E x de…ned by E x = fy 2 S : x y and y xg :
Assumption 5 guarantees that fE x j x 2 Sg indeed de…nes an equivalence relation with di¤erent classes either coinciding or not intersecting. The binary relation on elements of S induces relation in equivalence classes by letting E x E y if and only if x y; note that this relation is well-de…ned in the sense that it does not depend on the elements x and y picked from E x and E y , respectively. Furthermore, this relation is acyclical in the sense that there do not exist distinct classes E 1 ; : : : ; E l such that E j E j+1 for 1 j < l and E l E 1 . Consequently, we can form a sequence of all equivalence classes E 1 ; : : : ; E m (where m is the number of classes) such that E j 6 E k for any 1 j < k m. Now, within each class E k , we enumerate its elements as k 1 ; : : : ; k jE k j so that k l k j k j for 1 j < l E k (this is feasible due to Assumption 2 0 (a)). Next, construct the sequence as follows: we give members of class E 1 numbers 1 to jE 1 j in the order they are listed in the sequence 1 1 1 ; : : : ; 1 jE 1 j , then we take members of class E 2 as they are listed in the sequence 2 , and so on. It is easy to show that the sequence constructed in this way satis…es (8). The rest of the proof closely follows the one of Theorem 1 and is omitted.
Similarly, an equivalent of Theorem 2 again applies.
Theorem 4 (Noncooperative Foundations of Dynamically Stable States with Limited
Transitions) Suppose that binary relation satis…es Assumption 5, that Assumptions 1 and 2 0 hold, that is su¢ ciently close to 1, and that the initial state is s 0 2 S. Then:
1. For any mapping satisfying Axioms 1 0 -3 0 there is a set of sequences f s ( )g s2S and a MPE of the game such that s t = (s 0 ) for any t 1. In other words, the game reaches (s 0 ) in a …nite number of steps (after one period) and stays in this state thereafter.
2. Conversely, for any set of sequences f s ( )g s2S , any MPE in pure strategies has the property that it reaches a certain state, s 1 , in a …nite number of periods (with one transition): for t 1, s t = s 1 . Moreover, there exists mapping : S ! S that satis…es Axioms 1 0 -3 0 such that s 1 = (s 0 ).
3. If, in addition, Assumption 5 holds, then the MPE is essentially unique in the sense that for any set of sequences f s ( )g s2S , any MPE strategy pro…le induces s t (s 0 ) for all Proof. The proof is essentially identical to that of Theorem 2 and is omitted.
These theorems therefore show that the essential results of Theorems 1 and 2 generalize to an environment with limited transitions. The intuition for these results and the recursive characterization of dynamically stable states are essentially identical to those in Theorems 1 and 2.
Applications
We now revisit the examples discussed in the Introduction, as well as a number of new examples, and show how the theory developed above can be applied in these cases to derive predictions about dynamically stable states. In some of the applications, we will allow for w i (s) = 0 for some i and s. This is to simplify notation, and setting w i (s) = " for " > 0 and small would not change any of the results or interpretations.
Ine¢ cient Inertia and Lack of Reform
We now provide a more detailed example capturing the main trade-o¤s emphasized in Example 1 in the Introduction. Consider a society consisting of N individuals and a set of …nite states S. We start with s 0 = a corresponding to absolutist monarchy, where individual E holds power.
More formally, W a = fEg. Suppose that for all x 2 Sn fag, we have that fEg = 2 B x , that is, E is not a block in coalition (and thus not a winning coalition). Moreover, there exists a state, "democracy," d 2 S such that (x) = d for all x 2 Sn fag. The other words, starting with any regime other that absolutist monarchy, we will eventually end up with democracy. Suppose also that there exists y 2 S such that
meaning that all individuals are better o¤ in state y than in absolutist monarchy, a. In fact, the gap between the payo¤s in state y and those in a could be arbitrarily large. Is straightforward to verify that Assumptions 1-3 are satis…ed in this game.
To understand economic interactions in the most straightforward manner, consider the extensive-form game (equivalent to that described in Section 4). Inspection of this extensiveform game makes it clear that for su¢ ciently large, E will not accept any reforms away from a. In particular, since, given our speci…cation, the game will reach state d in a …nite number of periods, for any gap between max x2S fw x (E)g and w a (E), there exists a su¢ ciently large that E is better o¤ to remain in state a.
This example illustrates the potential (and potentially large) ine¢ ciencies that can arise in games of dynamic collective decision-making and emphasizes that commitment problems are at the heart of these ine¢ ciencies. If the society could collectively commit to stay in some state y, then these ine¢ ciencies could be partially avoided. And yet such a commitment is not possible, since once state y is reached, E is no longer a blocking coalition and the rest of the society wishes to progress towards d.
Middle Class and Democratization
Let us consider a variation on this game. Suppose again that the initial state is s 0 = a, , where
To start with, suppose that there is only one other agent, P , representing the poor, and two other states, d1, democracy with limited redistribution, and d2, democracy with extensive redistribution. Suppose that W d1 = W d2 = fP g. As before,
and w a (P ) < w d1 (P ) < w d2 (P ) ;
so that P prefers extensive redistribution. Given the fact that W d1 = W d2 = fP g, once democracy is established, the poor can implement extensive a distribution. Anticipating this, E will resist democratization.
Now imagine that an additional social group emerges, M , representing the middle class, and the middle class is su¢ ciently numerous so that
Their preferences are also opposed to extensive redistribution, so
This implies that once state d1 emerges, there no longer exists a winning coalition to force extensive redistribution. Now anticipating this, E will be happy to establish democracy (extend the franchise). Therefore, this example illustrates how the presence of an additional player can have moderating e¤ect (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a , for examples in which the middle class may have played such a role in the process of democratization).
Voting in Clubs
Let us now return to Example 2. Let the society consists of N individuals, so that I = f1; : : : ; N g. Following Roberts (1999) , suppose that there are N states, of the form s k = f1; : : : ; kg, 1 k N . Roberts (1999) imposes the following strict single crossing property:
He then considers two voting schemes: majority voting within a club (where in club s k one needs more than k=2 votes for a change in club size to be implemented) or median voter voting (where the agreement of individual (k + 1) =2 if k is odd or k=2 and k=2 + 1 if k is even are needed). Roberts proves that under either rule there are no cycles, and the same set of stable clubs emerges.
To show how Roberts's model is a special case of the analysis here, let us adopt the following simplifying assumption for any i 2 I and k 6 = l, w s k (i) 6 = w s l (i) :
Though not necessary, this assumption simpli…es the analysis, in particular, avoiding certain complications that arise when k is even. Majority and median voting rules imply the following structure of winning coalitions,
In addition, let us also refer to a Modi…ed Roberts model, in which only odd-sized clubs are allowed. It is straightforward to verify that Roberts's original proof of existence of equilibria apply without any change to this modi…ed model.
The next proposition establishes that the analysis of this paper is applicable to Roberts's model, and also establishes the link between the mapping that satis…es Axioms 1-3 and Roberts's Markov Voting Equilibrium when attention is restricted to odd-sized clubs. We also provide a de…nition of Markov Voting Equilibrium for completeness.
De…nition 2 (Markov Voting Equilibrium) A transition rule y ( ) is a mapping that corresponds a probability distribution (a lottery over the next states) to each state s k . De…ne continuation value of individual i if the current state is s k and transition rule is y ( ) by V i (s k ; y ( )).
For each state s k consider set Y (s k ) such that for any y 2 Y (s k ) and any state z, the number of players among players 1; : : : ; k such that V i (y; y ( )) > V i (z; y ( )) is at least as large as the number of those with V i (y; y ( )) < V i (z; y ( )). Transition rule y ( ) is a Markov Voting
Equilibrium if the support of y (s k ) is a subset of Y (s k ) for any state s k .
Note that according to this de…nition, a majority that strictly prefers a transition is not necessary for a transition to take place, which contrasts with the approach taken in our paper.
Nevertheless, the following proposition shows that Roberts's (1999) model and results follow directly from the general framework developed in this paper. Proof. See the Appendix.
Gradual Franchise Extension
Let us now use a variant of Roberts's model, together with our extension with limited transitions Given the structure, it can be shown that when (s j ) = s k where k > j + 1, the dynamic game of franchise extension starting with state s j will proceed gradually; there will …rst be an extension to a franchise of f1; : : : ; j + 1g, then to f1; : : : ; j + 2g, etc. until we reach f1; : : : ; kg. It is also possible to construct other examples of gradual franchise extension using this framework.
Stable Voting Rules and Constitutions
Let us now return to the question of self-stable coalitions posed in Barbera and Jackson and discussed in Example 3 in the Introduction. The society takes the form of I = f1; : : : ; N g, and each state now directly corresponds to a "constitution" represented by a pair (a; b), where a and b are natural numbers between 1 and N . In Barbera and Jackson's interpretation, a votes are needed to implement a change in some policy variable away from status quo, while b votes are needed to change the current state. Barbera and Jackson consider cases both with a; b N=2 and with a; b > N=2 (though they note that the former could lead to non-existence of equilibria). Let us simplify the discussion by focusing on the case where a; b > N=2. States with a = b correspond to voting rules, and those with a < b correspond to constitutions, where modifying the current state is more di¢ cult than changing the policy.
Players di¤er in their ex-ante probability of favoring the change; assume that this probability for player i is p (i), which induces preferences over states s = (a; b). Without loss of generality, assume that p (i) is nondecreasing in i. Barbera and Jackson show that this utility, w (a;b) (i),
is "single-set-peaked," in that if there is more than one peak, these must be two neighboring peaks and that w (a;b) (i) satis…es a single-crossing condition. Moreover, it can be veri…ed that generically (in terms of perturbations of p's), there is only one peak and the single-crossing condition holds strictly. To simplify the exposition let us suppose that there is a single peak and strict single crossing holds.
In Barbera and Jackson, voting rules and constitutions are assumed to have only one-step dynamics (i.e., any deviation ends the game). Consequently, it is possible that a rule is unstable in the sense of Barbera and Jackson, but players will not deviate from it if they play an in…nite-horizon game (the converse, however, is true: a stable point in the sense of Barbera and Jackson is necessarily stable point in this game). Nevertheless, we may slightly alter the setup to replicate Barbera and Jackson's predictions about the stability on voting rules. In particular, let us augment any voting rule by adding a state that yields the same payo¤ as but cannot be changed (or, alternatively, requires unanimous voting to be changed). In that case, players would always be able to switch to this "additional" state which is impossible to move away from. cab with these assumptions, the following result can be established.
Proposition 2 In the modi…ed version of the model of Barbera and Jackson described above:
1. Assumptions 1 and 2 are satis…ed.
2. There exist mappings v for the case of voting rules (a = b) and c for the case of constitutions (a b) that satisfy Axioms 1-3.
3. Any stable voting rule a satis…es v (a) = a. Proof. See the Appendix.
Coalition Formation in Nondemocracies
Let us look next turn to the game of dynamic coalition formation we …rst studied in Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008) . Assume that the set of states S coincides with the set of coalitions C.
This means that members of the coalition (potentially, both insiders and outsiders) determine the composition of the club in the next period. Assume furthermore that each agent i 2 I is assigned a positive number i which we interpret as "political in ‡uence," and for any coalition
Let payo¤s be given by
for any i 2 I and any X 2 C S. This is a special case of the payo¤ structure in Acemoglu,
Egorov and Sonin (2008), where we allowed for any payo¤ function satisfyingthree properties: 
Evidently, this corresponds to weighted -majority voting among members of incumbent coalition X (with = 1=2 corresponding to simple majority). Finally, take X to be any permutation of agenda-setters in I.
It is straightforward to verify that Assumption 1 is satis…ed for the set of winning coalitions given by (11). Now suppose that the following simple genericity assumption holds:
Then Assumption 2 is also satis…ed: for part (a), simply take the state which minimizes X for X 2 Q in any Q S; for part (b), note that there cannot be any cycles (suppose there were a cycle; then it could be broken in the state with minimal total in ‡uence X among the elements of the cycle). It is also easy to check that Assumption 3 holds.
In Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) , we interpreted this game as one of "eliminations" from ruling coalitions in nondemocracies, so that once a particular individual was eliminated, he could no longer be part of future ruling coalitions (either because he is "killed,"permanently exiled, or is permanently excluded from politics via other means). Moreover, we assumed that payo¤s were realized at the end of the game. The results of that model can be represented as a special case of our framework here by using the generalization in Section 5. In particular, suppose that transition X Y is feasible if and only if Y X. Clearly, this represents the structure of transitions in the paper and the relation de…ned in this way satis…es Assumption 5. In addition, the framework developed here also enables us to generalize the results in Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008) by allowing any transitions to be feasible.
Proposition 3 Consider the environment in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) . Suppose that the genericity assumption (12) holds. 2. There exists a unique outcome mapping elim that satis…es Axioms 1 0 -3 0 . This mapping yields the same equilibrium (dynamically stable) states as in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) .
3. Consider an extended version of this environment where any transition is possible (i.e., X Y is feasible for any X, Y 2 C). In this extended version, Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satis…ed, and there exists a unique outcome mapping that satis…es Axioms 1-3. This mapping may not yield the same dynamically stable states as in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) .
The next example illustrates both the reasoning of dynamic coalition formation in nondemocracies and also how this proposition generalizes Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin's (2008) results by allowing previously-eliminated players being brought back.
Example 5 Start with the case where I = fA; B; Cg with A = 3, B = 4, C = 5 and let = 1=2. Evidently, states, or, equivalently, coalitions fAg ; fBg ; fCg are stable, while fA; Bg ; fB; Cg ; fA; Cg are not (leading to fBg ; fCg ; fCg, respectively). As a result, coalition fA; B; Cg is stable: (1) the elimination of any two players can be easily blocked by these two players; (2) the elimination of one player would then lead to the elimination of the weaker of the remaining two players, and therefore it will also be blocked. This example thus illustrates the fundamental insight discussed after Theorem 1 in the clearest possible fashion: the coalition fA; B; Cg is made stable by the instability of the subcoalitions fA; Bg ; fB; Cg and fA; Cg-because players realize that any deviation from fA; B; Cg will lead to a further round of elimination.
The example in the previous paragraph has the simple feature that it is never optimal to include more players to a stable coalition. to the set of those at power. Any politician who is alive can be brought back into the ruling coalition, but "resurrections" are not possible. Suppose also that execution is costly. It can be veri…ed that this modi…ed game also satis…es Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 5 and that the results of Proposition 3 still hold. In this case, we can construct examples where eliminations take place without executions and also examples with executions. For instance, starting with the example of fA; B; C; Dg above, player D will excluded from the ruling coalition but will not be executed, since there is never any danger that he will be brought back. However, if there are six players with powers 100, 101, 103, 107, 115, and 131, then provided that the cost of execution is not too high, f100, 101, 131g will form the ruling coalition and will execute 103, 107, and 115. This is because if any one of these three players survived, 100 and 101 would use him to replace 131, thus making f100, 101, 131g unstable to start with.
Other Examples
In this subsection, we brie ‡y discuss a range of other examples. This discussion is not meant to provide a full analysis of the corresponding economic problems or even of these examples.
Instead, it is simply meant to illustrate the variety of di¤erent economic interactions that can be incorporated into this framework.
Here are some additional examples.
Example 6 (Coalition Formation in Democracy) Suppose that there are three parties in the parliament, 1, 2, 3, and any two of them would be su¢ cient to form a government. Suppose that party 1 has more seats than party 2, which in turn has more seats than party 3. The initial state is ?, and all coalitions are possible states. Since any two parties are su¢ cient to form a government, we have that W ? = ff1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2; 3gg. First suppose that all governments are equally strong and a party with a greater share of seats in the parliament will be more in ‡uential in the coalition government. Consequently, w f1;2g (3) = 0 < w f1;2;3g (3) < w f1;3g (3) < w f2;3g (3). Other payo¤s are de…ned similarly. In this case, it can be veri…ed that (?) = f2; 3g. Next suppose that governments that have a greater number of seats in the parliament are stronger. In this case, we can have w f1;2g (3) = 0 < w f1;2;3g (3) < w f2;3g (3) < w f1;3g (3) and likewise, so that the strongest two-party coalition may form, i.e., (?) = f1; 2g.
This model becomes more interesting if we enrich it further. In particular, suppose that after the coalition between parties 1 and 2 forms, party 1, by virtue of its greater number of seats, can sideline party 2 and rule by itself, i.e., f1; 2g f1g and W f1;2g = f1g. Suppose that party 2 can also do the same starting from the coalition with party 3, i.e., f2; 3g f2g and W f2;3g = f2g. However, once party 2 starts ruling by itself, then party 1 can regain power, that is, f2g f1g and W f2g = f1g, because it has more seats than party 1. In this case, it can be shown that (?) = f2; 3g.
What makes f2; 3g dynamically stable in this case is the fact that f2g is not dynamically stable itself. This example therefore reiterates the fundamental principle discussed after Theorem 1 in Section 3 and also in the context of coalition formation in nondemocracies in the previous subsection: the instability of states that can be reached from a state s contributes to the stability of state s.
Example 7 (Concessions in Civil War) Suppose that a government, G, is engaged in a civil war with a rebel group, R. The civil war state is denoted by c. The government can initiate peace and transition to state p, so that W c = fGg. However, p r, where r denotes a state in which the rebel group becomes very strong and dominant in domestic politics. Moreover, W p = fRg, and naturally, w r (R) > w p (R). If w r (G) < w c (G), there will be no peace and (c) = c despite the fact that we may also have w p (G) > w c (G). This illustrates the same forces as in the example on resistance to e¢ ciency-enhancing reforms or to bene…cial institutional changes discussed above.
As an interesting modi…cation, suppose next that the rebel group R can …rst disarm partially, in particular, c d, where d denotes the state of partial disarmament. Moreover, d dp,
where the state dp involves peace with the rebels that have partially disarmed. Suppose that W dp = fG; Rg, meaning that once they have partially disarmed, the rebels can no longer become dominant in domestic politics. In this case, provided that w dp (G) > w d (G), we have (c) = dp.
Therefore, the ability of the rebel group to make a concession changes the set of dynamically stable states. This example therefore shows how the role of concessions can also be introduced into this framework in a natural way.
Although we have been primarily motivated by political economy environments, the next two examples show that the general idea developed here can be applied to a variety of other problems.
Example 8 (Holdup) This example shows how the canonical model of holdup can be captured in a slightly modi…ed version of our model. Imagine that there are two players, 1 and 2. The economic situation is one in which player 1 has to decide whether to make an investment and increase the quality of a good that he will supply to player 2. Player 2 then has to decide how much to pay to player 1. Let the states be fs 0 ; i 0 ; ni 0 ; ih; il; nih; nilg, where s 0 is the initial state, i 0 represents investments by player 1, and ni 0 represents no investments. We have s 0 i 0 and s 0 ni 0 , and W s 0 = f1g. This captures the fact that player 1 can decide unilaterally whether to invest or not. ih corresponds to investment by player 1 rewarded by high payment by player 2, whereas il involves investment by player 1 and low payment by player 2. nih and nil are de…ned similarly. Clearly, i 0 fih; ilg and ni 0 fnih; nilg. However, we do not allow s 0 fih; ilg or s 0 fnih; nilg, so that the transitivity the part, part (b), of Assumption 5 is relaxed. As in subsection 6.4, the characterization results provided in Theorems 3 and 4 continue to hold in this case. Since player 2 will unilaterally decide whether to make high or low payment, W i 0 = W ni 0 = f2g, and because the game ends after the payments,
With the usual assumptions on payo¤s, in particular, w nih (1) > w nil (1), w ih (1) > w il (1), and w nih (2) < w nil (2), w ih (2) < w nil (2), and also assuming that states s o , i 0 , and ni 0 have the lowest payo¤s, so that no player wishes to stay in these states, we can verify that this is a special case of our general model and (s 0 ) = nil, even though nih may involve higher rewards for both players.
Example 9 (Riley equilibrium) The famous notion of Riley equilibrium (Riley, 1979) in asymmetric information games can also be modeled using the concepts introduced in this paper.
In particular, recall that the Riley equilibrium is sometimes used in the context of the model of insurance with adverse selection proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , in particular when a standard Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium does not exist. The idea of this equilibrium re…nement is that, when considering deviations, …rms might take into account further deviations by others that may then become pro…table and take place in the future. Despite its popularity and widespread use, the Riley equilibrium does not have solid microfoundations. It is possible to provide some microfoundations for this equilibrium concept by considering a dynamic game, which is also a special case of the framework here.
Let c be a candidate equilibrium. We have c d, meaning that there is a possible deviation from the candidate equilibrium by some player, say D, and to capture the unilateral deviation, let W c = fDg. Following this deviation, another …rm, DD, can engage in further rounds of deviations, o¤ering another set of contracts that were previously absent in the market. These contracts become pro…table precisely because of the presence of the contracts o¤ered by …rm D.
Let the state in which these two deviations are present be denoted by dd, and clearly d dd and
We can continue inde…nitely with additional rounds of deviations, but this simple example is su¢ cient to give the basic idea. In particular, suppose that
, meaning that without a deviation the potential deviator, D, makes zero pro…ts.
The deviation is pro…table, but a further deviation will lead to losses. Moreover, a further deviation is pro…table for the second deviator, i.e., w d (DD) = w c (DD) = 0 < w dd (DD).
Under the assumptions described here, it can again be veri…ed that (c) = c, meaning that the candidate equilibrium is dynamically stable. Consequently, no deviation takes place, even though the …rst deviation by …rm D is pro…table. In fact, it can be shown that (c) = c will hold generally whenever c is a Riley equilibrium (even if the standard Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Rothschild-Stiglitz game does not exist). The reason for the absence of a pro…table (and admissible) deviation is that this deviation makes yet another round of deviation possible, ultimately making the initial deviator lose money.
Conclusion
A central feature of collective decision-making in many social groups, such as political coalitions, international unions, or private clubs, is that the rules that govern regulations, procedures for future decision-making, and inclusion and exclusion of members are made by the current members and under the current regulations. This feature implies that dynamic collective decisions must recognize the implications of current decisions on future decisions. For example, current constitutional change must recognize how the new constitution will open the way for further changes in laws and regulations and how these further changes might a¤ect the long-run payo¤s of di¤erent players.
In this paper, we develop a general framework for a systematic study of this class of problems.
We We show that our framework is general enough to nest various di¤erent models that have been used in the literature to analyze speci…c problems in which current collective decisions a¤ect future decision-making procedures. These include models of ine¢ cient inertia (lack of reform) because of fear of changes in the future balance of political power, models of institutional change and enfranchisement (such as Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001 , 2006a , Lizzeri and Persico, 2004 , Jack and Laguno¤, 2006 , models of voting in clubs (such as Roberts, 1999, Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev, 2001) , models of the stability of constitutions (such as Barbera in Jackson, 2004) , and models of coalition formation in democracies or nondemocracies. In these cases and in a number of others, we show how either the exact model previously studied in the literature (or a generalization or a slight variant thereof) is a special case of our framework and how this allows us to derive the main economic insights in a straightforward manner.
Although our framework is fairly general, our analysis still relies on a number of important assumptions. Some of those are necessary for our general approach (for example, a minimum amount of acyclicity is essential). Others are adopted for convenience and can be relaxed, though often at the cost of further complication. Among possible extensions, we believe that most interesting would be to introduce stochastic elements, so that the set of feasible transitions or the distribution of powers change over time, or to include additional state variables, such as capital, so that some subcomponent of the state variables have autonomous dynamics. Such extensions would allow us to incorporated an even larger set of dynamic political games within this framework. We view the analysis of such dynamics as an interesting area for future research.
the leftmost median if k 1 is even) voter m strictly prefers s k j to s k 1 ; also note that m did not strictly prefer s kr to s k 1 for r < j. Now consider state s k j ; clearly the median voter (or both of them) have number greater than or equal to m; equality is only possible if s k j = s k 1 + 1 and so there are no clubs in between. This means that none of the median voters can strictly prefer s kr with r < j to s k j , and therefore such s kr cannot get a majority. Evidently, the same holds for median voters in clubs s kq with q > j. So, we can take clubs s kr with r < j out of consideration, because if the median voter of club s kq with q j weakly prefers s kr , r < j, to s kq , then he strongly prefers s k j . We can repeat the procedure above; since the number of clubs is …nite, we will eventually …nd a club that is better than any other club in Q. As for part (b), it is su¢ cient to take a median voter in state z and pick his most preferred club among the set of clubs under consideration.
One can similarly check that for median voter rule the assumptions are satis…ed as well. median voters, and if there are two clubs that these median voters like best, but disagree over which one is better, then could map the initial club into any one of these two.
(Part 3) Suppose that is close to 1 and a pure strategy Markov Voting Equilibrium (MVE) of the Modi…ed Roberts game (which exists by hypothesis) maps each club s to the next-period club (s). Roberts's argument that there are no cycles in the MVE continues to apply. Therefore, with (s) iterated, the sequence f n (s)g will converge in no later than after N 1 iterations. Let (s) = N 1 (s) for any club s. We will now use the de…nition of MVE to show that mapping satis…es Axioms 1-3.
Axiom 3 is trivially satis…ed: for any club s, ( (s)) = 2(N 1) (s) = (s). Take Axiom 1.
Suppose it does not hold; given that we assumed no indi¤erences, this means that for some s, the set of players in club s who prefer (s) to s does not constitute a majority, which, since club size is odd, means that a majority prefers s to (s). But then any player i in this majority has V i ( (s) ; ( )) > V i (s; ( )), because the continuation value starting from (s) is arbitrarily close to w (s) (i) since is close to 1, and therefore is worse than w s (i), making it worthwhile for the majority to stay an additional period in s. This contradicts that is a transition rule in a MVE, therefore, 1. The proof that Axiom 2 holds is: if some state z such that (z) = z is preferred to (s) by a majority, then this majority would be better o¤ from switching to state z.
Since Axioms 1-3 are satis…ed, mapping must coincide with the unique mapping from Part 2 that satis…es these Axioms. This completes the proof. would have some other (a 00 ; b 00 ) (a 0 ;N ) (a 0 ; N ). This means that each player prefers (a 00 ; b 00 ) to (a 0 ; N ), which of course implies that at least a players prefer (a 00 ; b 00 ) to (a; b), so (a 00 ; b 00 ) 2 Q.
But there is player i who at least weakly prefers (a 0 ; b 0 ) (and therefore (a 0 ; N ), which is the same as far as immediate payo¤s are concerned) to any other element in Q. This means that such (a 00 ; b 00 ) does not exist, and state (a 0 ; N ) is stable. Axiom 2 then implies that c (a; b) cannot equal (a; b), since state (a 0 ; N ) is c -stable and is preferred to (a; b). This completes the proof. hence Z X, and therefore transition X Z is feasible, too.
(Part 2) The existence and uniqueness result follows from Part 1 and Theorem 3. To show the equivalence result, one needs to check that if the outcome mapping elim satis…es Axioms 1 0 -3 0 , it also satis…es Axioms 1-4 in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) , which, as we proved there, is unique, and in the generic case we consider, single-valued. Then any initial state s 0 is mapped by the mapping elim to the same state as by the mapping from that paper.
(Part 3) Assumption 1 is not changed as compared to Part 1, so there is nothing to prove.
To prove that Assumption 2(a) holds, for any set of states Q take the one with the least total 
